IP Address: 125.227.110.205Malicious
IP Address: 125.227.110.205Malicious
This IP address attempted an attack on a machine in our threat sensors network
Role |
Attacker, Scanner |
Services Targeted |
MSSQL SMB |
Tags |
SMB Null Session Login Access Share SMB File Operation By CMD Successful SMB Login System File Modification Service Deletion Download File DNS Query Service Stop Service Creation Execute from Share SMB Share Connect CMD Service Start Port 445 Scan Download and Execute Port 1433 Scan Access Suspicious Domain |
Associated Attack Servers |
IP Address |
125.227.110.205 |
|
Domain |
- |
|
ISP |
HiNet |
|
Country |
Taiwan, Province of China |
|
WHOIS |
Created Date |
- |
Updated Date |
- |
|
Organization |
- |
First seen in Akamai Guardicore Segmentation |
2022-11-27 |
Last seen in Akamai Guardicore Segmentation |
2023-11-10 |
What is Akamai Guardicore SegmentationAkamai Guardicore Segmentation is a data center and cloud security solution that protects the organization's core assets, using flexible, quickly deployed and easy to understand micro-segmentation controls. Akamai Guardicore Segmentation generates in-context security incidents, with details on attacker tools and techniques, that help IR teams prioritize incident investigation and reduce dwell time. Learn More
A user logged in using SMB with the following username: Administrator - Authentication policy: Correct Password |
Successful SMB Login |
C:\VeMgBDHd.exe was downloaded |
Download File |
vemgbdhd.exe was executed from the remote share \\server-backup\c$ |
Execute from Share |
c:\windows\system32\services.exe installed and started \\server-backup\c$\vemgbdhd.exe as a service named hmXV under service group None |
Service Start Service Creation |
C:\windows\temp\svchost.exe was downloaded |
Download File |
C:\windows\temp\tmp.vbs was downloaded |
Download File |
A user logged in using SMB with the following username: Administrator - Authentication policy: Previously Approved User 4 times |
Successful SMB Login |
Service hmXV was stopped |
Service Stop |
Process c:\windows\system32\mshta.exe attempted to access suspicious domains: w.beahh.com |
DNS Query Access Suspicious Domain |
C:\OugosQtp.exe was downloaded |
Download File |
c:\windows\system32\services.exe installed and started \\server-backup\c$\ougosqtp.exe as a service named dIjE under service group None |
Service Start Service Creation |
ougosqtp.exe was executed from the remote share \\server-backup\c$ |
Execute from Share |
The file C:\WINDOWS\zLzMl.exe was downloaded and executed 2 times |
Download and Execute |
System file C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\AutoRecover\88744D2A29102FC88ECF505DD2E984FC.mof was modified |
System File Modification |
Process c:\windows\zlzml.exe attempted to access suspicious domains: info.ackng.com, info.beahh.com and ip.42.pl |
DNS Query Access Suspicious Domain |
Process c:\windows\zlzml.exe generated outgoing network traffic to: 192.168.0.10:445, 192.168.0.11:1433, 192.168.0.11:445, 192.168.0.12:1433, 192.168.0.12:445, 192.168.0.13:1433, 192.168.0.13:445, 192.168.0.14:1433, 192.168.0.14:445, 192.168.0.15:1433, 192.168.0.15:445, 192.168.0.16:1433, 192.168.0.16:445, 192.168.0.17:1433, 192.168.0.18:1433, 192.168.0.18:445, 192.168.0.19:445, 192.168.0.1:1433, 192.168.0.1:445, 192.168.0.20:1433, 192.168.0.20:445, 192.168.0.21:445, 192.168.0.22:445, 192.168.0.23:445, 192.168.0.24:445, 192.168.0.25:445, 192.168.0.26:445, 192.168.0.2:1433, 192.168.0.2:445, 192.168.0.3:1433, 192.168.0.3:445, 192.168.0.4:1433, 192.168.0.4:445, 192.168.0.5:1433, 192.168.0.5:445, 192.168.0.6:1433, 192.168.0.6:445, 192.168.0.7:1433, 192.168.0.7:445, 192.168.0.8:445 and 192.168.0.9:445 |
|
Process c:\windows\zlzml.exe scanned port 445 on 25 IP Addresses |
Port 1433 Scan Port 445 Scan |
Process c:\windows\zlzml.exe scanned port 1433 on 25 IP Addresses |
Port 1433 Scan Port 445 Scan |
Process c:\windows\zlzml.exe scanned port 445 on 16 IP Addresses |
Port 1433 Scan Port 445 Scan |
Process c:\windows\zlzml.exe scanned port 1433 on 16 IP Addresses |
Port 1433 Scan Port 445 Scan |
Connection was closed due to timeout |
|
C:\ABgASgjJ.exe |
SHA256: 3c2fe308c0a563e06263bbacf793bbe9b2259d795fcc36b953793a7e499e7f71 |
56320 bytes |